

The paths and pitfalls of ideology as an ideology

I have beliefs, principles, values, standards. You are besotted by an ideology. He and she are besotted by ideologies. We have tradition, commonsense, wisdom or science. You are slaves to an ideology. They are slaves to ideologies.

If we continue being so lucky, we shall at least make our successors laugh. Think of the fun of recalling successive politicians saying: "Action, not words". Or try a harsher guffaw: what, in the seventies, is the most common topic of discussion among West European and North American Marxists? Answer: ideology. What, in West Europe and North America, is the most commonly quoted example of an ideology? Answer: Marxism.

It is now more than twenty years since an authoritative voice announced the "end of ideology." We were now living, it was said, in a "post-industrial society" (save that joke for the nineties), in which ideological systems and ideological politics were irremediably out of date and irrelevant. Hasty analysis might conclude that the words were a signal for a generation, not only of intensified ideological conformation, but of emphatic and exhaustive analysis of contemporary ideology.

The history of "ideology" as a concept is long and complicated, but a summary must be risked. It was invented in 1796 by Destutt de Tracy, to describe a "science of ideas" which must be distinguished from the old metaphysics. As a branch of science it was firmly placed within biology or, more strictly, zoology.

But almost at once a different sense, which will be familiar to all his political heirs, was introduced and popularized by Napoleon Bonaparte. An ideology was a contrived system of ideas which "ideologues" imposed on experience and would, if allowed, impose on a people. Each sense persisted, but in the course of the nineteenth century a third sense was added: an ideology was a system of beliefs characteristic of a certain class, group or people.

Production of meaning

This too became popular, and meanwhile the scientific sense, as in Destutt, declined. Two new generalizing senses replaced it. Ideology was "false consciousness", to be contrasted with "positive knowledge" and with science. Or, neutrally, ideology was the sphere of the production and signification of meanings, no longer primarily within biology but within philosophy, psychology, linguistics and communications.

In popular political usage Napoleon still rules. But what would his successors, if they could be brought to look, make of the long, secular and rational inquiry into the nature and basis of ideas which the emphasis of ideology represents? What, in particular, with their received formula of an ideology as something imposed on experience, would they make of one of the most powerful contemporary positions: that all experiences, and especially the individual subjects who have the experiences, are produced by, precisely, ideology?

The distance between popular discussion, even among otherwise highly educated people, and the present state of the professional analysis of ideology, could hardly be greater.

There are two obvious reasons for the contemporary popularity of ideology as a term and as a subject. Our political world is commonly seen as the arena of a struggle between two very powerful ideological systems, of which all other positions are held to be deducible variants. This situation produces the mutually denunciatory and interchangeable paradigms.

On the other hand, in West Europe and North America there is a specific and unprecedented problem of political analysis for all those who believe that, while there is universal electoral democracy and relatively unqualified freedom of speech and assembly, there is still also a ruling class based on minority power, economic but also political. The distinguishing character of

Raymond Williams looks at changing uses of the concept of 'ideology' in the analysis of cultural and social institutions

the "new left" movements which began in the sixties in just these regions, and which included what is usually called the student revolt, is that cultural and educational processes and institutions were at or near the centre of attention, so that even the savage war in Vietnam was, at least in part, seen and (at a distance) contested through them.

The increased importance of modern social communications had in any event, in a wider spectrum of opinion, shifted concern with cultural processes from peripheral to central, or at least centrally symptomatic. The expansion of higher education in the same regions shifted both education and culture into the centre of politics.

Ideology, as a term in this phase, has become critical. Previously there was a loose coexistence between the two most popular senses: a system of ideas imposed on experience, and a system of ideas characteristic of a class or group. Some quite fair-minded people could see these processes as general and, in that sense, equivalent.

Education was then seen as, in its best sense, a "leading-out" from the condition of being imposed upon. If characteristic ideas and beliefs were still eventually arrived at, the process was conscious and grounded; stock notions and prejudices had been exposed to the rigours of full knowledge and free inquiry.

It was then genuinely shocking for such men to be told, not only by students but by some of their colleagues, that their versions of full knowledge and free inquiry were themselves ideological, and that their methods of teaching, selection and examination, like the standard methods of news presentation, of opinion testing and forming, right up to parliamentary elections—and of course the ownership and control of cultural and educational institutions—had to be seen as the fibres of a specific ideology.

Those who stayed to listen (they were not all that many) could observe, certainly, what had happened to ideology as a term. It was now no longer, or more strictly not only, a description of a system of relatively formal beliefs; it was rather a description of a body of practices, relationships and institutions, of an extent, indeed, which called other classifications of the same areas—politics, culture, even society—into (confusing?) question.

It has been a process with many strands and overlaps, but the central position which underlies it can be identified: it is structuralism, in its post-war sense. A social system is seen as the carrier (producer or product, but that is an area of contention) of meanings which are also and inevitably practices, and of values which are also and inevitably relationships.

Earlier analysis of ideology had compared meanings and practices, or values and relationships: literature and society; ideas and institutions; beliefs and class situations. Ideologies and historical situations. Much of this kind of analysis, of course, continued. But the special challenge of the structuralist emphasis, and of some related formalist and other emphases, lay in new procedures of systematic analysis, with the special presumption of universal autonomous systems.

Borrowing procedures and terms from versions of structural anthropology and structural linguistics and, more indirectly, from certain kinds of mathematics and genetics, such analysis offered to supersede the comparison of relatively formed "areas" and to assume—and then demonstrate—the significance of total systems, of which the systematic internal relations were the primary (or indeed in some versions the only admissible) evidence. Ideology, then, was no longer at the top of the mind, or at the top

of the class. On the contrary, it was the systematic constitution of minds and classes.

In its purest and most extreme form, this version of ideology is, in practice, comparatively rare. But for some years, questions which were formerly discussed under the headings of class or culture have been increasingly discussed under the heading of ideology. The pure structuralist formulation, which gives title to this inclusiveness, is thus more powerful in setting the terms of the argument than in more specific positions.

When actual current theory and practice is closely examined, it is evident that the specialized inclusive sense of ideology coexists with a range of other theories which come to limit its autonomy, and especially its universality. Thus Althusserian Marxism, which has done most to popularize the new sense, retains "last-instance determination" by the economy, which can be taken as overlapping with more familiar Marxist positions on ideology and class.

There is a retained contrast between ideology and "science", which is often read as if it were the old contrast between "false consciousness" and "real, positive knowledge", though it is meant in fact, to be different. And the widest sense of ideology as a set of dominant meetings and practices can be taken as equivalent to Gramsci's difficult concept of "hegemony" though Gramsci's fundamental attachment to historical analysis is incompatible with pure structuralism.

Thus although the title of the inquiry has shifted dramatically, there is as wide a range of fundamental positions as at any earlier point. What is new is the intensivity of the inquiry, though at its present stage, which is very much mid-term, a large part of the work is expository and annotative, and the comparative lack of applied analysis has limited theoretical clarification to predominantly conceptual comparisons.

It is therefore very interesting to read *Working Papers in Cultural Studies: 10: On Ideology*, from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University. Over the years, and through several changes of style, the centre has contributed more analysis of what is now being called ideology than any other British institution. In recent years it has been especially preoccupied with the intensifying theoretical arguments which affect its difficult disciplines.


Most of the papers in this volume read like seminar briefs, and as such are useful. Stuart Hall, unlike most of the other contributors, brings historical analysis to the development of the leading concepts and theories. There are then analyses of Lukács, Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas; a review of varying Marxist positions on ideology and the "artistic text"; and an examination of Marx's and other Marxist "humanist" and Althusserian positions on individuality.

Photography as text

Papers like these are now being very widely written, in what is at its best a learning process and at its worst (and ironically) a process of reproduction. It is useful to have some of them brought together, as a focus for discussion.

What is just as interesting, however, is the appearance of this collection of papers inside a cover which seems to me to raise the whole problem at a quite different level. There is a remarkable front photograph from the Durham miners' gala: a lodge banner bearing a public-relations photograph of Harold Wilson; people sitting on the grass under it, with picnic scraps and laid-down instruments; a child, foreground, holding up a ceremonial sword; in the background, beyond a picket fence, Ada's Snack Bar caravan.

The photographs, you might say, has it all. But all what? I spent some time looking to and fro between the expository texts and this picture: interrogating it and them, as the phrase now goes. I



Images in search of an interpretation: the cover of *Working Papers in Cultural Studies* No 10.

could see Lukács on proletarian consciousness running for cover; the appalling possibilities of the child and Wilson as Lacan-type mirror-images; a quick image of Gramscian hegemony.

But then, most interestingly, given both the photograph and the selection of the photograph, I found myself reviewing the structuralist definition of the "text" (here the photograph) as an assembly of inscribed signifying practices. Everything could be done with that photograph in that way. But every item and every relation in it seemed to me to break out of that frame: to be not only "ideology" but highly variable (and varyingly interpretable) social relations, now presented selectively by photographer and editor and thus, by a kind of metaphor, reducible to a (doubly) ideological text.

Some of the papers, of course, do not exclude that kind of reading, though at the present stage of exposition and annotation very few are open enough to emphasize it. And this, I think, is the heart of the current argument. The relative distance imposed by theoretical review permits the assimilation of selected evidence to the most diverse positions and procedures, under the single title of "ideology", which seems to me now to mask rather than to clarify the most urgent and most serious theoretical and practical choices.

What would have been really significant would have been a series of tailpieces to each of the papers about the cover, which appears to unify them. (Actually, knowing the critical vigour of the centre, I expect they are already in effect doing this.)

Meanwhile, there are two essays in the volume which, as applied studies, raise questions about the concept which brings them together. Eve Brook and Dan Finn contribute an interesting critique of the methodology and the assumptions of "community studies" in defining the postwar working class.

It is significant (and, to "historians" and others, welcome) that in their conclusion they write that their "basic argument is that in analysing working-class 'images of society', what must be placed at the heart of the analysis is their historical nature."

Similarly, in an exceptionally interesting review of "socio-democratic" approaches to educational reform, Dan Finn, Neil Grant and Richard Johnson write of "particular versions of what schools are for, of how they work and of what it is possible for them to achieve" as "ideologies (and we shall continue to insist on the plural)".

The plural emphasis is again welcome, though the eventual thrust of the argument is to demonstrate the "coexistence" of different positions—summarized as "equality" and "equality of opportunity"—and it is then not clear whether these were merely historically fused (and confused) by the Labour Party or whether, as the formalist element of their analysis would indicate, they are necessary parts of a "dual repertoire".

It is at such points that the ideology of ideology, in its current theoretical phase, comes into question. In these essays there is an evident tension between empirical historical analyses of systems of ideas and their social sources and consequences and, on the other hand, models of ideology as coherent and totalizing (masking) systems, which can be discussed in terms of texts and codes, with metaphors such as "repertoire" from formal elements of play.

In much recent theoretical work, including most of the essays in this volume, the latter mode is dominant and social relations and social movements tend to be seen through the procedures of a kind of textual analysis, for which an already-selected, and thus reciprocally-confirming, version of history is the (marginal) text.

These relations and movements are "seen through", also, in another sense, since the dominant tone is dismissive, with a confidence that follows from the analytic (unmasking) procedures, rather than from any declared and substantial alternative position and policy. And this can be seen, in its turn, as the ideology of a group driven back, in an exceptionally frustrating period, from significant political intervention and participation, but regrouping within certain kinds of educational institution and intellectual work.

It is clear that "ideology" as a description of a system of ideas characteristic of a class or group (a system involving intellectual procedures as well as formal beliefs) and "ideology" as a term of emphasis on actual material signification from local signs to elements of institutions are still necessary description in social and cultural analysis.

What is crucial is that work which employs these concepts should be genuinely interactive, with, and never merely a substitute for, the fully material complexities of social history, social relations and social conflict.

The author is professor of drama at Cambridge University WCP510 is available from Birmingham University, price £1.75.

BOOKS

A cuckoo using a sparrow's nest

Shakespeare's Dramatic Challenge
by G. Wilson Knight
Croom Helm, £5.95
ISBN 0 85664 309 2

Shakespeare: The Man and his Achievement
by Robert Speaight
Dent, £6.50
ISBN 0 460 04268 8

Modern Shakespeare Offshoots
by Ruby Cohn
Princeton University Press, £15.70
ISBN 0 691 06289 7

Wilson Knight has spent a good proportion of his 80 years and his dozen books on Shakespeare trying in one way or another to bridge the gulf between the academic and theatrical approaches to the plays. His latest book, *Shakespeare's Dramatic Challenge*, is in many respects his last word, a summary of his critical achievement in Shakespeare studies. It is also the one in which he addresses himself most thoroughly to the problem of the gulf as he sees it. Starting from his identification of it in *The Wheel of Fire* as an intellectual defeat, a barrier which should not be there, he has worked out his own way of straddling it and now gives us his findings.

Shakespeare's Dramatic Challenge is, strictly speaking, only the libretto for the performances Knight has evolved to bridge the

gulf. They are performances (or chapters) designed to demonstrate and comment on what he calls the "rising quality" of Shakespeare's tragedies and tragic heroes. The book has to be read partly as the tip of his phenomenal iceberg of Shakespeare criticism, partly as the libretto for his programme of recitals.

In the straddling process one foot stands firmly on his academic theory that Timon is the culmination of all Shakespeare's tragic heroes. The theatrical foot rests on the point that the poetry spoken by the heroes follows a rising pattern within each play and from one play to the next, culminating in *Timon of Athens*. The point is a rather wobbly one. Much of Knight's detailed commentary on the poetry is superbly acute, and equally rewarding to reader or actor. On single plays he can be wonderful. His analysis of Romeo's poetry in Act V and of the pattern of Richard II's development is splendid. But the method has inherent weaknesses which limit the achievement of the book.

On his theatrical side Wilson Knight is a monodist. Every play is presented in this book as an exposition of the tragic hero alone. Hence his vision of the plays rising up to the second half of *Timon*, where the hero occupies the stage throughout, and speaks almost entirely in monologue interrupted only occasionally by visitors from the world he has rejected. Knight rationalizes his vision with the academic theory that Timon is the only one of all Shakespeare's heroes free of the Dionysiac elements present in what he calls the "dramatic" supermen of the earlier tragedies, the only Apollonian, monodic hero.

The frailty of this view appears on the theatrical side. *Timon's* second half is undramatic, the least theatrically manageable of all the plays. It is the one section in all Shakespeare where directors feel most free to cut, alter, add or titivate. And Knight is compelled to do it too. On the assumption that the second half was left unrevised, an early draft with only Timon's speeches fully worked out, he adjusts the order of the scenes and suggests business which might help to carry it off on stage. It's a sort of Catch-22 in which the Apollonian hero, Shakespeare's last word must, in order to become Apollonian, shed the dialectic and therefore the dramatic conflicts of the Dionysiac heroes of the earlier plays. To qualify as Knight's perfect superman he must lose his dramatic qualities. One cannot help suspecting



Sir Laurence Olivier as Macbeth in Glen Byam Shaw's 1955 production at the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre. From *Macbeth Onstage: An Annotated Facsimile of Glen Byam Shaw's 1955 Promptbook*, edited by Michael Mullin and published by the University of Missouri Press at £20.80.

that Knight elevates Timon because he most nearly matches Knight's own monodist inclinations.

Reading the book as more Knight than Shakespeare reinforces this suspicion. On *Macbeth*, the other most nearly monodist hero, Knight is sensitive and convincing, but looking at what he says of Gaunt's sceptred isle speech or Henry V's Agincourt speech makes you wonder how he could uphold their jingoistic bravura as splendid poetry without at least some note of the dramatic context which ought to complicate our responses to them as jingoism and therefore as dramatic poetry. Along with this single-minded devotion to the poetry as speeches goes a love of noisiness which I suspect is perilously close to ham. Noting Hamlet's advice to the players, for instance, Knight is forced to argue that tragic poetry should be delivered in a manner "at once torrential and yet temperate", which is not very helpful, nor does it allow for the modulations which exist even in the players' speeches in *Hamlet*.

One difference between academic and theatrical approaches to Shakespeare—not a difference deep enough to make a gulf—is the inclination of the academic critic to be oracular, to seek for a statement about the plays which will have some of the validity of scholarship (that lovely chimera, the "definitive" statement). The critic tries to suppress not the subjectivity of his own response but the appearance of subjectivity. The impersonal voice of the critic assumes that there is only one Shakespeare. Theatrical approaches on the other hand, seeing the plays as raw material for stage performance, more or less openly acknowledge that theirs is a Peter Hall or a Marowitz *Hamlet*, whoever gets the ultimate credit. Academic Shakespeare would perhaps gain by acknowledging itself to be as ephemeral as theatre production.

This view of the gulf, if gulf it is at all, is reinforced for me by two other recently published books. Robert Speaight's *Shakespeare: The Man and his Achievement* appears also to be the product of a lifetime devoted to both the theatrical and academic study of the plays. But it is a self-indulgent book, shaky in its scholarship and

narrow in its perspective. Any title which lays claim to encompass Shakespeare's "achievement" implies a complacent author, too sure of his authority, too ready to speak with the appearance of objective truth, and the book itself confirms what the title suggests. Wilson Knight is anything but complacent, and he has incomparably greater critical works to his name, but he shares the weakness which goes with the oracular voice.

The book which to me emphasized this inherent weakness in both Knight and Speaight is Ruby Cohn's *Modern Shakespeare Offshoots*. Some way from being a catalogue raisonné of stage adaptations of Shakespeare (it is openly selective) it looks enthusiastically but critically at what creative writers and producers over the last two centuries have done with Shakespeare on the stage and in fiction. Her list is a bit idiosyncratic—in fiction she analyses Wilhelm Meister's *Hamlet* but not Mr Wopsle's; in theatre her line between straight production and re-creation is vague, including the Hall/Barton histories but excluding Tyrone Guthrie's *All's Well*; and by confining herself chiefly to the English, French and German offshoots she overlooks some berries of the riper sort, particularly the Russian. But one could hardly ask for more expertise or experience in an author than Professor Cohn's three languages and the breadth of her knowledge as a theatre-goer across Europe and America. She surveys offshoots ranging from Sterne to Bond, and theatre from Hauptmann's naturalism and Laforque's symbolism through surrealism, expressionism and epic theatre, drama of the absurd, theatre of cruelty, environmental theatre, experimental theatre, concrete theatre, to Marowitz's collages and Rumbelow's Triple Action Theatre. We have *Hamlet* visualized on stage as a spider's web, *Julius Caesar* as a sequence of wall paintings, seven types of *Macbeth* and several shades of Caliban. The writers include Goethe, Laforque, Shaw, Joyce, Jarry, Auden, Césaire, Brecht, Ionesco, Dürrenmatt, Grass, Bentley, Kops, Stoppard, Bond; writer-producers include Welles, Marowitz, Tzara, Hall/Barton and Rumbelow.

What Ruby Cohn's book does most impressively is to canter with comfort and assurance through all this range, not hesitating to register her verdicts and not seeking to identify much in the way of patterns. Trivializing is her favourite word of dismissal, but she is acute on the various levels of triviality too. Stoppard's *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead* she describes as dovetailing *Hamlet* scenes into a *Godot* situation, and summarizes it as "a witty commentary rather than a theatrical exploration into either great work". She calls her subject matter a chance of conglomeration and rather nobly refuses to identify any recurrent patterns or indeed to offer any overview. She notes how many rewritings are political in intent and sees "a strong moral purpose behind the most provocative Shakespeare offshoots". Any axes of her own she leaves on the shelf. Describing Césaire's *Une Tempête* with sympathy she records surprise at her own polemical tone.

Using offshoots from Shakespeare of course imposes some sort of pattern from the start. Whether he is an inspiration, a model or just a cultural substratum, whether the offshoots are a reaction against old hat or adjustments to find new relevance, demystifying or being inventive, the starting point is the same. And it is this which makes the book so rewarding. A pattern so basic makes the material a fascinatingly revealing cross-section of modern theatre. The motives for rewriting Shakespeare vary enormously. Shaw typically claimed to have turned him from a divinity and a bore into a fellow creature. More recently Edward Bond said of *King Lear* that modern society uses the play wrongly, "And it's for that reason I would like to rewrite it so that we now have to use the play for ourselves, for our society, for our time, for our problems". Both writers are claiming to make Shakespeare more, in the current vogue word, relevant. Shaw in reaction against the nineteenth century stage romanticisers, Bond along the lines suggested by Raymond Williams in *Modern Tragedy*. The distance between the two notions of relevance is the sort of measurement which makes literary and theatrical history come to life.

Cohn lists a thesaurus of words for rewriting Shakespeare, including abridgements, adaptations, amplifications, emendations, revisions and versions. To which we can add, presumably, offshoots, and thinking of Speaight and Wilson Knight, criticism. Some of our contemporaries, says Professor Cohn, cherish Shakespeare for his relevance to us, whereas others remould him into relevance. Where, we might wonder, does the one process begin and the other end? Shaw, always jealous of his own Shakespeare, once wrote to John Barrymore advising him to try *Hamlet* with an uncut text and to concentrate on acting rather than authorship, at which he could not outdo his original. Cutting a Shakespeare text, using it as, in another of Shaw's descriptions, a cuckoo uses a sparrow's nest, is an operation not different in kind from either a collage production or a critic's published reading. They all stand in the relation of audience to Shakespeare. Writers who make offshoots, directors with new versions, critics who offer definitive readings are all doing the same things, and there is no gulf between them any more than there is between academic and theatrical approaches. Wilson Knight's concern over the gulf is one of those agonies of flame that singes nobody's sleeve.

The frontispiece of Knight's 1964 *Shakespearean Production* is a photo of Knight as Timon in his 1940 production. The frontispiece of *Shakespeare's Dramatic Challenge* is a photo of him as Timon in 1976, aged 79. It is a full-length view taken from below to show him towering over his audience (emphasizing his pectorals, which are impressive, more than his wig, which is not). Perhaps some such image of the author should be put at the beginning of every book about Shakespeare.

Andrew Gurr

Indian Arden

Shakespeare Turned East
by Henry W. Wells and H. H. Anniah Gowda
Prasaranga, University of Mysore,
Rs30, \$10.00

There is a distinctively Indian voice to be heard in today's Shakespearean studies. It is perhaps best represented by such a critic as S. Viswanathan, whose essays, self-effacing, subtly phrased and meticulously scholarly, originate from insights that might not have come to a Western critic. *Shakespeare Turned East* is criticism of a different kind. It is a far ranging, ambitious attempt at what its publishers call "spiritual comparisons" between Shakespeare's late romances and the classical drama of India.

The subject is promising. The most uninformed Western reader who wanders a little way into Indian literature must be struck by similarities in substance and mood to those plays in which, as Auden puts it, we hear the solemn music strike and the statue move "to forgive our illusion". The subject is also large enough for two men's lifetimes, and in theory such comprehensiveness should be the fruit of collaboration between Professor Gowda and Professor Wells. Yet inter-continental collaboration is not easy; proofs appear to have got lost in transit, with the result that the book is spattered with misprints that can do little good to the reputation of a university press.

Collaboration may also explain the curiously disjointed effect of *Shakespeare Turned East*, which is divided into short chapters that usually stop just at the point when they are becoming interesting. A study, for example, of the power of recollection in both kinds of drama seems to be on the verge of some forceful contrasts, as well as comparisons, between the *rasa*, or "taste", of a play based on Eastern reflection and one dominated by Western nostalgia, when it is interrupted—that really is the effect—by a lightning tour through the mythological themes of Sanskrit and Elizabethan literature. The comparisons here are too nebulous to be helpful; and many that seem more precise, such as the parallel between the two sons in *Cymbeline* and the plot of the *Uttararamacarita*, only indicate the widespread prevalence of certain folktale motifs. The affinities of thought are what we really want to hear about, and the chapter on *The Tempest* and *Sakuntala* helps by its exploration of the way that Eastern drama, because it "underplays the potency though not the existence of evil", relates more easily to Shakespearean romance than to Shakespearean tragedy. But we have to be hurried on to dramatic conventions; to the copiousness of Elizabethan carving and Indian sculpture; and to stage music, with a nod in passing to Bach (1685-1750), Beethoven (1770-1827) and Brahms (1833-1897). All of whom have, as Gilbert (1836-1911) might have observed, nothing to do with the case.

It has to be kept in mind that Indian readers may be glad to be given their bearings by such names and dates, just as the English reader is grateful for the orientation afforded by names and dates of the Indian dramatists. But I cannot get rid of an uneasy feeling that this book, like many in comparative literature, feeds the penchant we all have in East and West alike for dropping names and tossing off knowing allusions. I am going to find it difficult to drop *Malavikagnimitra* and *Svapnavasavadatta* into the literary chat, but I hope to slip in "Prospero is a benign Vishnu". And yet behind the prickles of aphorism and the thick screen of literary history, there is a kind of sleeping beauty at the heart of this book. An awareness of this has made me search the local libraries for translations of Kalidasa. And this I think would be pleasing to both authors of *Shakespeare Turned East*.

Molly Mahood